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Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology XX(X) why corruption emerges (e.g., Becker & Stigler, 1974; Connelly & Ones, 2008; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Zim, 2005) . Typically, researchers have sought to test these theories by analyzing relationships between country corruption levels ("societal corruption") and variables as diverse as wealth, political institutions, country personality profiles, and societal values (e.g., Connelly & Ones, 2008; Goel & Nelson, 2008; Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005) . We aim to add to the existing research by examining longitudinal effects of country-level variables that are associated with corruption across countries and across time. We use data from the Corruption Perception Indexone of the most commonly used measures of corruption internationally (Treisman, 2007) -as an indicator of societal corruption. We then link perceived corruption to societal values, wealth, and political institutions, in a longitudinal, multilevel model.
In contrast to previous studies, our work is interdisciplinary, borrowing theoretical approaches from economics and political theory and integrating these with a values perspective. Furthermore, our study appears to be the first to link changes in values across a large number of societies to changes in levels of corruption over time. Values have previously been shown to account for a significant share of the variance in corruption (e.g., Connelly & Ones, 2008; Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2007) , but past studies have not examined whether value changes affect corruption. Finally, our use of not only longitudinal but also multilevel analyses-modeling variability both within and across countries-allows greater insight into the dynamics of corruption over time.
Corruption Across Countries
Economists argue that societal corruption is the sum of individual corrupt activity and that individuals engage in corrupt activity when an opportunity to misappropriate public funds coincides with their individual incentives to act corruptly (e.g., Becker & Stigler, 1974; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Treisman, 2000; World Bank, 2009a) .
2 Incentives are greater when there is a low probability of detection, low cost of punishment, and high benefit from the corrupt activity, and they are lower when there is high accountability. Opportunities are greater when funds/resources that should be destined for public use are available in an appropriable form and individuals have discretion or monopoly over access to those resources (Klitgaard, 1988) . This "opportunity plus incentives" framework for understanding corruption derives from economics but can also be adopted to conceptualize the relationship between sociocultural variables and corruption, as we explain below. 3 Values and corruption. Societal values can be conceptualized in several different ways (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Schwartz, 1999) . Past research has identified correlations between various societal values and corruption (e.g., Connelly & Ones, 2008; Getz & Volkema, 2001; Husted, 1999; Kimbro, 2002; Licht et al., 2007; Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005) . For this study, we investigated the two values dimensions developed by Inglehart and Baker (2000) . The first contrasts traditional values (which emphasize deference to authorities and parents, social conformity, greater influence of religion, and conservative social behaviors) with rational values (which emphasize greater egalitarianism and tolerance). The second dimension contrasts survival values (which emphasize a focus on hard work, limited leisure, materialism, and authoritarian rule) with self-expression values (which emphasize quality of life and individual rights to express themselves freely and challenge the existing order).
These dimensions not only are encompassing of alternative value frameworks (i.e., they are broad and conceptually very similar to and show convergent validity with other value domains- Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, 1999 Schwartz, , 2006 but also comprise the only value set that is based on representative samples across nearly 40 years of study.
Both dimensions are likely to be important for understanding corruption. For example, selfexpression values may decrease incentives for corruption as they emphasize interpersonal trust and civic-mindedness over personal gain (Welzel & Inglehart, 2010) . In support of this prediction, Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann (2003) found that countries that initially had high selfexpression value scores subsequently had lower corruption levels (a time-lagged correlation between values and corruption). Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005) observed a similar correlation between self-expression values and lower corruption cross-sectionally, noting that country selfexpression value scores accounted for more than half of the variance in average corruption between countries.
Similarly, rational values may create fewer opportunities for corruption, because they favor a more egalitarian society in which there are fewer entrenched hierarchies and power imbalances, meaning that individuals in societies with more rational values are less likely to have the opportunity to wield-and potentially misuse-high discretion and power. In line with this prediction, Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005) found that rational values were positively correlated with lower corruption and accounted for approximately a quarter of the variance in average corruption between countries.
Societal wealth and corruption. Wealth is likely to play a role in corruption. People in poor countries may have greater incentives to engage in corrupt activity because of its relatively high benefits. Low income creates challenges for making ends meet and is likely to create incentives for generating supplementary income. In addition, lower income countries often have fewer financial resources for creating efficient law enforcement institutions, making corruption less likely to be detected and punished. In line with these predictions, corruption has consistently been found to be higher in poorer countries (e.g., see reviews in Lambsdorff, 2006; Svensson, 2005) .
Political institutions and corruption. Political institutions (such as large governments and democratic conventions) may also influence opportunities and incentives for corruption. Countries with larger governments may provide more social services and employment opportunities and have more law enforcement agents, decreasing incentives for corruption (due to lower "need" and higher risk of being caught). Democratic conventions may make politicians and associated bureaucrats more likely to be held accountable for their use of resources, decreasing their opportunities for corruption. In turn, lower corruption within the government can decrease perceived social acceptability of corruption and reduce corruption among the general public (Tavits, 2005) . In line with these predictions, both larger public sectors (Goel & Nelson, 2008) and higher levels of democracy (Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005; Treisman, 2000 Treisman, , 2007 have been associated with less corruption.
The Current Study
As the above discussion shows, past studies have linked corruption to a number of societal factors. We aim to address a number of remaining issues.
First and most important, previous studies on corruption have investigated the relationships between these variables and corruption at single time points (e.g., Welzel et al., 2003) or averaged across time points (e.g., Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005) . However, none appear to have investigated relationships across multiple time points. Accordingly, our study analyzes longitudinal data from 59 countries in a two-level linear growth model (within countries over a 28-year period) as well as differences between countries.
Second, psychological research on values and corruption has not fully examined the effects of wealth or institutions vis-à-vis values. Wealth is strongly correlated with values (e.g., Schwartz, 2006, in press; Welzel, 2010) , and therefore could actually be causing apparent values effects,
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Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology XX(X) and institutions could express latent value orientations (e.g., Fischer & Schwartz, in press; Schwartz, in press) , which may influence the magnitude of corruption differences across societies. To test the relative contribution of each set of predictors, our study examines values, wealth, and institutions in a single model. This allows us to analyze the relative corruption predictive strength of these variables, and their correlations, and thus test the boundary conditions of predictability of values in cross-cultural research.
For within-country, over time comparisons, we hypothesized that greater wealth (Hypothesis 1a), greater democracy (Hypothesis 1b), larger government size (Hypothesis 1c), higher rational societal value scores (Hypothesis 1d), and higher self-expression societal value scores (Hypothesis 1e) would be associated with lower corruption within countries over time.
These predictions assume that because these variables have predicted corruption in ecological analyses, they will also predict corruption within countries over time. This seems justifiable. Conceivably, in countries where increasing societal wealth results in individuals having sufficient income to meet their needs (without needing illegal supplements), where governments have increasing resources for law enforcement, and where increasing democratic transparency and accountability decreases unchecked discretion and increases the risk of being caught, opportunities and incentives for corruption will decrease.
In a similar vein, we predicted corruption to decrease as societies shift from having more traditional and survival-oriented societal values (which are associated with more opportunities and few disincentives for abusing public power) to having more rational and self-expressionoriented societal values (which are associated with fewer opportunities and greater disincentives for abusing public power). Of course, such shifts may be slow (Inglehart & Baker, 2000) .
For cross-level comparisons, we hypothesized that, adjusting for effects of within-country variables, greater wealth (Hypothesis 2a), greater democracy (Hypothesis 2b), larger government size (Hypothesis 2c), higher rational societal value scores (Hypothesis 2d), and higher selfexpression societal value scores (Hypothesis 2e) at Level 2 (between countries) would be associated with lower corruption at Level 1 (within countries).
Method
Data on corruption, wealth, political institutions, and values were drawn from published sources, covering the period 1980 to 2008 for 59 countries (listed in full in the appendix).
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Corruption
We measured corruption with the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which, unlike other perceptions indicators (e.g., see Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2003 , mitigates bias by aggregating results of several surveys and rating systems covering the views of both in-country and out-of-country commentators. CPI scores were available for 13 years for some countries but over a shorter period for others (not all had been covered since the CPI's inception in 1995). To expand the coverage period, we augmented official CPI data from a very similar index constructed from two sources used in the CPI (compiled by the Internet Center for Corruption Research, n.d., and covering the periods 1980 Research, n.d., and covering the periods to 1985 Research, n.d., and covering the periods and 1988 Research, n.d., and covering the periods to 1992 .
CPI scores range from 1 to 10, 10 being least corrupt. There was substantive variance in corruption in our 59-country sample: The mean CPI score was 5.4, and mean standard deviation within countries was 2.6. Although some of this variance may be the result of slight changes in the CPI sources over time, the CPI is generally seen as a robust indicator and is widely used (e.g., see Paldam, 2002; Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005) .
Societal Values
We measured values using data from the World Values Survey on Inglehart and Baker's (2000) self-expression (versus survival) values and rational (versus traditional) values. Inglehart and Baker (2000) report evidence of the validity of these scores.
We used recently updated country scores from Inglehart (n.d.), attributing Wave 1 values to 1981, Wave 2 to 1990, Wave 3 to 1995, Wave 4 to 2000, and Wave 5 to 2006. Rational values are expressed by high average country agreement to items such as "God is not very important in my life," "it is less important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than to learn independence and determination," and "I favor less respect for authority." Traditional values emphasize opposite values or opinions. Self-expression values are expressed by agreement to items such as "I emphasize self-expression and quality-of-life (rather than focusing on economic and physical security)," "I have signed a petition, and would do so again," and "people can be trusted." Survival values emphasize opposite values or opinions.
Wealth
We measured wealth using inflation-adjusted GDP per capita data for 59 countries. Poor data availability in low-income countries (GDP below US$1,000 per capita) resulted in our sample being slightly biased toward middle-(US$1,000-$10,000 per capita) and high-income countries (above US$10,000 per capita).
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Political Institutions
We measured strength of political institutions using two indicators: degree of democracy (from Vanhanen's [2000] Index of Democratization, a multiple of competition for power and democratic participation) and government size (from the World Bank's 2008 World Development Indicator Database measure of general government final consumption expenditure as a percent of the country's GDP).
6 Unlike some other indicators of democracy (e.g., Marshall & Jaggers, 2009) , the Index of Democratization showed reasonable variance over the time period covered in this study: The mean country score on the Index was 20.64, and the mean standard deviation was 13.82.
Data Analysis
Given the complexity of the data, we first analyzed correlations and conducted a regression on the aggregated data set. Next, we then tested predictors of corruption within countries across time (as set out in Hypotheses 1a-1e) using HLM 6 (Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2004) . We then tested predictors of corruption across levels (as set out in Hypotheses 2a-2e) using a two-level model with maximum likelihood estimation in HLM 6. In our analysis, years were nested within countries. Level 1 modeled the effect of group mean-centered predictor for countries across available time points, enabling us to assess how well each indicator predicted corruption within a country over time. Level 2 modeled the intercept (mean corruption at Level 1), enabling us to assess the average effect of group mean-centered country-level variables, controlling for time effects.
Results
Preliminary Cross-Sectional Analysis
To provide a point of comparison for the longitudinal and cross-level analyses, we initially ran correlation analyses and a multiple regression at the ecological or country level. As shown in Table 1 , wealth, government size, democracy, and rational and self-expression societal values were all significantly and positively correlated with "lack of corruption" (higher CPI).
A regression analysis (F 5,130 = 72.24, p < .001, adjusted R square = .73) indicated that wealth (β = .50, p < .001), government size (β = .20, p < .01), and self-expression values (β = .26, p < .01) were all significant unique predictors of corruption perceptions.
Predictors of Low Corruption Over Time
To test Hypotheses 1a-1e, we ran three linear growth models in HLM, first with fixed effects (which assume the relationship between each predictor and corruption is similar in each country) and then with random effects (which assume this relationship varies between countries).
The first model tested the predictive power of wealth, government size, and democracy for low corruption within countries over time. A chi-square analysis indicated that the random effects model represented a statistically better fit of the data (χ 2 (9) = 365.12, p < .001), suggesting that the relationship between corruption and wealth, government size, and democracy varies significantly between countries. Thus, only results from the random effects model are reported below.
The results of the random effects model (see Table 2 ) for wealth, government size, and democracy provided support for Hypothesis 1a (higher wealth predicted lower corruption within countries over time; t(58) = 2.73, p = .01) but did not provide support for either Hypothesis 1b (greater democracy was not a significant predictor of lower corruption within countries over time; t(58) = 1.67, p = .10) or Hypothesis 1c (larger government size was not a significant predictor of lower corruption within countries over time; t(58) = 1.11, p = .27).
The next two models (reported in Table 3 ) tested the predictive value of self-expression values and rational values for lack of corruption within countries over time both alone (A) and alongside Cross-level predictors of corruption. To test Hypotheses 2a-2e, we ran several two-level models in HLM. As with the within-country linear growth models, a chi-square analysis indicated that the random effects model was a statistically better fit to the data than the fixed effects model (χ 2 (9) = 373.87, p < .001); therefore, only the final model with random effects is presented (Table 4) . As shown, results from the two-level model provide support for cross-level Hypotheses 2a, 2c, and 2e: Wealth was a significant predictor of lower corruption between countries controlling for within-country effects, t(53) = 5.79, p < .001, as was government size, t(53) = 3.05, p = .004, and higher self-expression values, t(53) = 2.50, p = .016. However, the results provided no evidence in support of Hypothesis 2b or 2d: Neither democracy, t(53) = -.38, p = .705, nor rational values, t(53) = -.49, p = .629, were significant predictors of corruption between countries, controlling for within-country effects.
In summary, in the final two-level model, within countries wealth was only a marginally significant predictor of differences in corruption over time, t(58) = 4.60, p = .05, and countries varied significantly in their relationship between corruption and wealth; but between countries wealth was a highly significant predictor of corruption levels. 8
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Discussion
In this study, we used a multilevel framework to examine whether value changes could account for changes in corruption, controlling for economic and institutional factors. Within countries, we found that only wealth significantly predicted changes in corruption; values and institutions did not. Across countries, we found that self-expression values, wealth, and government size all predicted corruption, but contrary to expectations, rational values did not. Thus, what appears to matter most for corruption are base levels of wealth, government size, and values promoting trust and social action.
Societal Values and Corruption
As predicted, our results showed that self-expression values are related to lower corruption across (but not within) countries, corroborating evidence that this value dimension is linked to important differences between societies (Welzel, 2010) . Importantly, self-expression values were unique predictors of corruption even controlling for country wealth-indicating that countries that value individual autonomy, social diversity, and more egalitarian social structures are less likely to be corrupt, regardless of economic conditions. Arguably, this also suggests that low corruption is linked with "civic mindedness," another correlate of self-expression values (Welzel, 2010) . In contrast, rational values did not show the hypothesized relationship with corruption, either across or within countries. Contrary to the colonial viewpoint still propagated by many politicians and transparency advocates (e.g., Ferrieux-Patterson, 2003)-and indeed, implied by other cross-cultural researchers (e.g., Connelly & Ones, 2008) 8 -societies with higher corruption may not need to emulate societies that have so-called rational and secular "modern" values (Inglehart & Baker, 2000) in order to reduce corruption. Larmour (2005) notes that several Pacific communities have adopted new institutions to help lower corruption while at the same time retaining traditional institutions and values. For example, Samoa has been developing a "traditional integrity system," which applies good practice principles promoted by Transparency International using a culturally appropriate framework.
The fact that neither set of values predicted changes in country corruption levels leads to several possible interpretations. One is that the values data set may have been too limited to observe significant longitudinal relationships, because of the number of value measurement points available from the World Values Surveys (only up to 5 time points). It could well be the case that values change more slowly than the decades covered in this study could reveal (but see Welzel & Inglehart, 2010) . It may also be the case that changes in values are not gradual or linear but rather happen in distinct "leaps"-for example, they may shift abruptly rather than smoothly across generations or when social and economic conditions change dramatically (Welzel et al., 2003) . Finally, it may be the case that changes in both self-expression values and corruption are driven by changes in a third variable such as societal wealth, rather than being directly linked. However, a temporal distance between the two seems likely: Qualitative research by Mansilla (2003) suggests that value change is an essential prerequisite for a reduction in corruption, and Welzel et al. (2003) propose a model in which value changes precede a decrease in corruption. As more data on values become available in the future, these competing interpretations may be able to be resolved.
Nevertheless, these findings are important, as they demonstrate that values can help to explain variability between societies but may not be appropriate for examining societal change as it occurs. In fact, values may not be causal variables of change but rather reflectors of earlier economic and social change (see Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Welzel et al., 2003) . Thus, our longitudinal results provide an important reminder of the limits of value analyses. To better understand social and cultural dynamics, cross-cultural psychologists would be well advised to broaden their set of variables-for instance, to include wealth and its immediate psychological correlates.
Wealth and Corruption
Extending previous cross-sectional and panel research (e.g., Lambsdorff, 2006; Svensson, 2005; Welzel et al., 2003) , our study found consistent effects of wealth on corruption within countries across time and across countries. However, the within-country link became weaker when wealth was included at Level 2. It also varied significantly between countries (as shown by the better fit of the random effects model than the fixed effects model); although the overall trend was for decreasing corruption with increasing wealth, some countries actually had higher corruption scores at times when they were wealthier. Exploratory analyses with our data set could not identify any macrovariable that accounted for this variability.
These findings show that ecological analyses (which suggest a significant and strong correlation between wealth and lack of corruption) may lead to overestimates of the effects of increasing wealth within countries. In reality, increases in wealth were not consistently associated with decreases in corruption; and to the extent that they were, the change in corruption was small.
These results may seem discouraging for countries that hope to reduce societal corruption as a by-product of economic development (e.g., as encouraged by Treisman, 2000) . However, no other variable studied was able to predict changes in corruption over time in the way that wealth did, suggesting that a focus on economic development as a path to reducing corruption is still justified. Nevertheless, it is necessary to "unpack" societal wealth into its various psychological, social, and economic components in order to better understand what differentiates societies that differ in wealth.
Distribution of wealth may also be important. For example, it may be the case that, in societies that have surprisingly low or high levels of corruption given their GDP, a minority monopolizes the majority of that society's wealth and power, thus creating conditions more conducive to corrupt behavior. Unfortunately, we could not identify a valid income distribution measure that would adequately cover the same range of countries and time points as the other variables. This is an avenue for future research.
Institutions and Corruption
Results also indicated (larger) government size was a significant predictor of (lower) corruption between countries (supporting previous work by Goel & Nelson, 2008) , but democracy was not. This relationship between government size and corruption was in line with predictions and may have been mediated by stronger law enforcement and better government services, which, over the long-term, may decrease incentives for corrupt activity. Future research could investigate such mediation effects by unpacking overall government consumption into government expenditure in different areas of the economy.
The finding that democracy was not a significant predictor in the multilevel model was consistent with the ecological-level analysis but contrary to our predictions. One explanation for this result is that democracy can be manifested at different formal and informal levels that were not adequately captured in our measure. Although the widely used Index of Democratization measures both competition for power and democratic participation, it does not take into
10
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology XX(X) consideration whether these important elements of democracy are both "genuine" and "deep." For example, voter turnout (and hence participation scores) may only be high because voters are compelled to vote by laws, by violent coercion, or through graft institutionalized as an informal control mechanism (Darden, 2008) . Thus, formal institutions may not reflect the deeper penetration of democratic ideals, which may be greater or lesser than the presence of formal institutions suggests (Welzel et al., 2003; Zim, 2005) . Future studies may need to look at a range of institutional factors to better capture this complexity. It seems unlikely that a single measure such as a cultural values indicator could be interpreted as a catch-all, latent manifestation of the myriad of formal and informal societal institutions (as recently suggested by Schwartz, in press).
Alternatively, it may be the case that the link between democracy and low corruption is limited to certain countries and relies on a particular cultural definition of corruption. For instance, Zim (2005) proposes that even "in the most established, mature democracies we are still faced with problems of campaign financing, lobbies and conflicts of interest" (p. 235), which in some cultural contexts would be considered corrupt but in others are legalized avenues of influence. Thus, while democracy is important for some countries, in others "there may be different yet equally efficient combinations of social institutions" that are better suited to reducing corruption (Licht et al., 2007, p. 682) . It would be interesting to investigate these alternatives in future studies, especially with respect to different cultural definitions of corrupt and acceptable activity.
Conclusion
Our results indicated that wealth, government size, and self-expression societal values separate those countries that are less corrupt from those that are more corrupt. Within countries, only increasing wealth was related to an individual country's decreasing corruption. These findings suggest that cross-sectional analyses provide an inadequate understanding of what influences corruption over time. Thus, agencies attempting to reduce corruption should focus on better understanding longitudinal social dynamics within individual countries, rather than simply importing institutions and economic strategies from countries that have lower corruption and assuming these institutions will work the same way in new environments. In other words, our findings may warrant a critique of the manner in which institutions such as the World Bank have favored international "best practice" for good governance over local, culturally compatible solutions. In particular, this study provided no evidence to support the importation of democratic institutions, or the (forced) adoption of rational values, as a means to reducing corruption (at least over the short term). 5. The terminology "low," "medium," and "high" for these income groups are based on the World Bank's classification system for country economies (World Bank, 2009b , 2009c . 6. Expenditure included all of the past year's purchases of goods and services (including payments to employees) and most expenditures on national defence and security (excluding acquisition of capital stock), as recorded in World Bank and OECD national accounts data files. 7. It was not possible to model societal values alongside wealth assuming random effects for all variables (HLM could not run this analysis because there was inadequate information to compute values coefficients under an assumption of random effects). 8. Connelly and Ones (2008) investigated the links between national personality-related variables and corruption levels and found that countries with low openness scores were more corrupt. They explained this by proposing a valid mechanism through which some nontraditional, secular societies may attain low corruption levels: "openness is associated with endorsing politically liberal and nontraditional values . . . [and] nations whose citizens tend to endorse such values would likely find their citizens to be more supportive of legislation aimed at curbing corruption" (pp. 373-74). However, this need not imply that traditional societies have higher corruption levels; indeed, our findings suggest that while some traditional societies are more corrupt, others are not. Thus, traditional orientation is not a defining characteristic of societal corruptness.
